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Abstract: 
The Nigerian state is caught in the crossfire of national insecurity arising from the insurgency of various rogue 
groups. The most prominent of these groups, and one whose activities have had far-reaching destabilising effect 
on the polity, is the Boko Haram sect. The Boko Haram sect, which uses the Taliban- and al-Qaeda-style 
terrorist tactics of suicide bombing and targeted assassination, is responsible for between 3000 and 4000 deaths 
since it declared war and engaged in armed insurgency in 2009. The sect has targeted and bombed state 
institutions, the United Nations building as well as many Christian worship centres in furtherance of its avowed 
objective of deploying terror to achieve the islamisation of the Nigerian state. Relying on secondary sources of 
data, the paper interrogates the force theory that underpins Nigeria’s security engineering and contends that the 
continued insecurity in the polity is a demonstration of its ineffectiveness. The paper also contends that the 
proposition by the Federal Government to grant amnesty to the Boko Haram sect is not as simplistic as it 
appears as it transcends the narrow definitional criteria of bartering forgiveness for peace. While the paper is 
critical of the proposed amnesty programme, it advocates a holistic approach that incorporates other issues that 
are promotive of justice, morality and ethicalness in the polity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The major challenge of Nigeria’s national 
security is the containment of diverse 
manifestations of violence spearheaded by 
various rogue groups. The major group in 
contemporary Nigeria that has stretched the 
resources, expertise, patience and even the 
competence of Nigeria’s security 
apparatuses to the limit, both individually 
and collectively, is the Boko Haram sect. 
The sheer number of deaths arising from 
bomb attacks orchestrated by the Boko 
Haram far outstrips any other cause of death 
in Nigeria, including epidemics (Bankong-
Obi 2012).  
 
One of the shortcomings of Nigeria’s 
security management is its pro-realist 
orientation that accords the deployment of 
force preeminent position. Thus, the 
strategy of choice among national security 
managers is the use of force in various 
guises to subdue those identified as 
threatening national security. But the 
government’s supposed superior force has 
not rolled back the menace of insecurity 
which creates the impression that the 
government is not doing enough to secure 
the people. This mindset led Bankong-Obi 
(2012) to attribute Nigeria’s intractable 
security challenges to government’s apathy 
towards exterminating the terror group and 
inefficiency on the part of the security 
agencies. The Boko Haram sect poses a 
security challenge that is alien to Nigeria’s 
regular security problems. While the use of 
force might have worked in the past, it has 
proved inefficient in the case of Boko 
Haram. This is so for four major reasons: 
one, the Boko Haram uses al-Qaeda-style 
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terror strategies, which combine suicide 
bombing, targeted assassination and 
guerrilla strategies to unleash violence on 
the polity; two, the sect has diffuse 
leadership system, making it impossible to 
initiate dialogue; three, its ideology is 
anchored on irrationality driven by utopian 
anarchism; and lastly, it has shifting 
membership that is patently faceless. The 
anarchist bent of the Boko Haram 
worldview is validated by its bomb attacks 
on Christian worship centres as well 
Muslims considered as not practising 
orthodox Islam (Onuoha 2012:2).  
 
The persistence of bomb attacks by the 
Boko Haram sect despite an all-out 
deployment of force by the state and the 
clamour by Nigerians for the government to 
find a lasting solution to the problem of 
insecurity appeared to have swayed 
government towards the adoption of non-
military option of amnesty. The present 
amnesty being proposed by the Jonathan 
administration seems to be driven by narrow 
political considerations. Amnesty is not 
imposed by fiat but emerges through 
negotiated arrangement based on certain 
defined conditions. The government had 
unequivocally set those conditions earlier 
namely, that it would not negotiate with 
ghosts, due to the sect’s faceless leadership 
and membership; and that the sect must 
present its basis of grievances as a platform 
for dialogue (BBC 2012; Guardian 2013a).  
 
The paper acknowledges that amnesty is a 
political tool designed to stop violence and 
restore peace but argues that it must be 
driven by the tenets of justice. The paper 
further contends that the unilateralism of the 
proposed amnesty represents a policy 
summersault which might deepen insecurity 
rather than resolve it. It holds that the 
sustainability of any form of amnesty 
programme for the Boko Haram sect must 
factor in the victims of their terrorist attacks.  
 
Contending Issues in Nigeria’s National 
Security Architecture 
Internationally and domestically, the issue 
of national security is constantly on the 
front burner (Obi 1997; Tyoden 2005). 
Irrespective of the regime type that is in 
control of governmental powers within 
states or the configuration of powers in the 
global arena, the preoccupation with 
national security has not diminished in 
importance since the emergence of state 
system. Within nation-states, whether it is 
military authoritarian regimes or civil 
democratic governments, considerations 
surrounding national security sit at the apex 
of the hierarchy of states’ national interest. 
At the core of these considerations are the 
twin issues of regime survival and the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of the 
state system. 
 Overtime, especially in the cold war era, 
the preoccupation of states with national 
security defined within the parametric 
confines of regime and state survival made 
its pursuit an end by itself rather than a 
means to an end. The effect was that states 
became fixated with developing the 
necessary capacity to ensure the survival of 
the government in power as well as preserve 
the state system from collapse arising from 
both internal and external threats and 
sabotage.  
 
This traditional realist mindset underpinned 
the equation of national security with the 
absence of threats to governmental authority 
or the presence of domestic capacity to 
contain centrifugal forces within the polity 
(Omeje 2006). Thus, under this paradigm, 
national security was conceptualised within 
the parametric context of innate and 
acquired capacity of governments to ensure 
the protection of their countries from 
external attacks or internal subversion, as 
well as the preparedness of the military to 
protect state territories. It also was 
interpreted as diligence in matters of 
intelligence gathering and secrecy, and the 
protection of resources and rights 
considered critical to the functioning of 
states (UNDP 1994; Encarta 2008; Nnoli 
2006). 
 
The core essence of this conceptualisation is 
that national security is motorised by the 
possession of the ensembles of warfare as 
well as the existence of military formations 
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to deploy them. The implication, therefore, 
is that threats to national security are mainly 
external rather than internal. Thus, the 
whole essence of the apparatuses of force is 
to rebuff and defeat any form of threat to the 
state. As such, the achievement of national 
security falls under the exclusive domain of 
the military and paramilitary formations 
across the state. The shortcoming associated 
with this conceptualisation is its seeming 
restrictive boundaries and analytical 
inadequacy (UNDP 1994; Onuoha 
2008:101; Adelugba 2008:20; Nwolise 
2008:348).   
 
The concept of national security has 
mutated from its static preoccupation 
characterised by narrow, restrictive, 
militaristic and strategic perspective to 
dynamic, broad-based incorporation of 
ensembles of various factors. The shift and 
expansion in the paradigmatic 
preoccupation of national security from 
traditional realist orientation to multilayered 
and broad perspective draws from deeper 
insights generated from other schools of 
thoughts. The various inputs from diverse 
intellectual traditions in the attempt to 
elucidate and expand the traditional 
frontiers of national security have imbued 
the concept with certain mystique (Nnoli 
2006:1; Adelugba 2008).  But attempts by 
various scholars to add quality and 
dynamism to the concept of national 
security are principally concerned with the 
issues of whose security is paramount and 
how to provide it (Omeje 2006:14; Onuoha 
2008:102). 
The intellectual and ideological ferment in 
the expansion of the domain of national 
security is exemplified by their emphases on 
a bouquet of factors as its constitutive 
parameters. Thus, the traditional realist 
approach and its contemporary variations 
situate the core concerns of national security 
within the framework of the state and its 
national interest anchored on its military 
capability to protect both; the  idealist 
school focuses attention on the 
emancipation of the individual rather than 
the state; the neoclassical/liberal 
economistic theorists see national security 
from the context of economic security or 
security of the economy, which is achieved 
through the free interplay of market forces 
in the resource allocation processes within 
and between societies; the structural 
ecologists focus on the linkages and 
interactions of ecology and politics 
especially in terms of the sustainability of 
the planetary ecosystem and the balancing 
of the negative impacts of economic 
activities on natural resource exploitation 
and the unhindered opportunity to non-
human lives to thrive; and Marxist political 
economy focuses on the reconciliation of 
the competing interests of the various 
classes in the state. To them, therefore, the 
national security cannot be understood apart 
from the interests of the social forces as they 
struggle with one another (Obi 1997; Omeje 
2006; Nnoli 2006).  
 
The expansion in the constituent elements 
that shape national security has produced a 
paradigmatic shift in contemporary 
definitional criteria of the concept.  National 
security, thus, transcends the traditional 
frontiers of state to incorporate man and his 
environment within the milieu of 
sustainability. Sustainability in national 
security means that actions taken by states 
in furtherance of the security concerns of 
the present generation must be such that 
cater for present needs of humans and non-
humans alike while making allowances for 
the unconditional meeting of the security 
needs by future generations (UNDP 1994; 
Dobson 2000).  
 
National security in Nigeria is still 
conceived from the prism of the realist 
paradigm. Thus, the strategy often adopted 
by the Nigerian state to tackle insecurity 
consists of, and is anchored on, the 
deployment of superior fire power to 
contain what the state has identified as 
threats to it, which often coincide with the 
interest of the ruling elite. As a result of the 
realist orientation and mindset of Nigerian 
security thinking, the Nigerian government 
perennially earmarks larger and larger 
portions of state funds for security. In the 
2012 federal budget, the Nigerian 
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government allotted 19.4 percent of the total 
budget to the security sector. Thus, in 
concrete terms, the security sector gulped 
N921.91 billion of the N4.75 trillion 
budgeted for the year (Leadership 2012). 
The logic behind the huge budgetary 
allocation to the security sector was to 
tackle the “the threat of Boko Haram, Niger 
Delta militants and increasing spate of 
insecurity and wanton destruction of lives 
and property by criminals which are on the 
rise"(President Jonathan cited in Leadership 
2011). 
 
Horsfall (2013:71) observes that the security 
budget for 2012 was not only phenomenal 
but was the largest allocation any 
government had budgeted in the history of 
Nigeria for the security sector. The 
phenomenal increment in the security vote 
not only enlarged the resources available to 
national security managers but also 
expanded the frontiers of the militarisation 
of the polity. It equally acted as a necessary 
fodder to the blossoming of corruption 
(Elombah 2010).  In Nigeria’s government 
circles, the security vote is not subject to 
audit verification. Once the security vote is 
captured in the budget, its spending is 
within the competence of the government 
officials authorised to spend it and the 
manner in which they deem its spending 
necessary is beyond audit query. The 
unaccountable nature of security vote led El 
Rufai (2012) to call it “slush fund”. The 
Human Rights watch (2007:39) captures it 
more succinctly thus: 
The security vote is a budget line 
that is meant to act as a source of 
discretionary spending that the 
executive arms of government can 
use to respond quickly and 
effectively to threats to peace and 
security in their jurisdictions. 
However the use of those funds is 
notoriously opaque; there is 
generally no requirement that 
governors or local government 
chairpersons account for their use 
of those funds. In many cases 
security vote money has been used 
by state and local governments to 
foment violence and co-opt 
political opponents or has been 
lost to graft and patronage. 
 
The militarisation of national security 
underpinned the setting up of coalition 
forces or joint task forces (JTF) to address 
sundry security threats. The Nigerian 
security architecture has, as its building 
blocks, such organisations as the police, the 
armed forces, and the various state security 
apparatuses, which are concerned with 
intelligence gathering. A consistent trait 
across the various security formations is the 
conscious efforts to militarise them. The 
Nigeria Police, whose primary 
responsibility is to maintain law and order, 
breaks them by converting their position 
into veritable instrument of oppression and 
extortion (Carter and Marenin 1979; Walker 
1999:56; Hills 2007:408; Alemika 2010).  
 
Another aspect of the militarisation of the 
police is the creation of the pseudo-military 
formation known as the Mobile Police 
(Mopol) with access to helicopter gunships 
and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as 
well as other ad hoc units that regularly 
compete amongst themselves for unleashing 
violence on the people. The JTFs are 
conferred with wide-ranging repressive 
powers. As oppression begets resistance, the 
deployment of force by the JTFs has neither 
diminished nor eliminated the incidence of 
insecurity in Nigeria. It has fostered the 
spirit of daring the state apparatuses of 
force, especially the JTFs. The creation of 
an alternative model of security framework 
to maintain internal security by the Nigerian 
government is a tacit acknowledgement of 
the incapacity of the police and other 
traditional institutions law enforcement to 
tackle crime. 
 
Part of the underlying causes of insecurity 
in Nigeria is the appropriation, 
personalisation and privatisation of state 
power by the elite and the exclusion of the 
masses from access to secure material base 
(Ake 1981:125-8; Nnoli 2006:70). The 
emergent ruling elite at the period of 
independence did not dismantle the 
apparatuses of oppression used by the 
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retreating British colonialists but 
consolidated on them. Thus, it was merely, a 
handover from one oppressor to another. As 
Onyeozili 2005: ) observes, “the nationalists 
against who (sic) police terror and violence 
were used by the colonialists, and to whom 
power was subsequently transferred at 
independence, cushioned themselves into 
employing police brutality and terror against 
their opponents in post-independence 
political power struggles”. 
 
Another cause is the tendency of the 
Nigerian security apparatuses to reify force 
as the whole essence of security. For 
instance, the Boko Haram was in existence 
before it embraced violence as its primary 
tool of operation. Its origin is traced to 2002 
, with some scholars dating it as far back as 
1995,  which suggests that prior to 2009, it 
operated as a non-violent organisation 
(Connell 2012:88; The Nation 2012; BBC 
2012a; Onuoha 2012:2). It was when the 
Nigeria Police applied extreme force which 
led to the death of its leader, Mohammed 
Yusuf and over 1,000 members of the sect 
that violence became its weapon of 
martyrdom (Onuoha 2012:3).  
 
The de-federalisation of security through the 
takeover of every aspect of security by the 
federal government created certain rigidity 
in the security system. The erosion of the 
federalist principles that ought to undergird 
the Nigerian state and all the apparatuses of 
governance, including its national security 
system originated from two interrelated 
factors, namely, military adventure into the 
political arena and the unfortunate Nigerian 
civil war and its after-effects (Babawale 
2007: 65). Although the earliest effort to 
centralise the police system was in 1958 
through the Police Act, Cap.154, Laws of 
the Federation (Onyeozili 2005:40), its 
consolidation was during the successive 
military regimes. One of the fallouts of 
Nigeria’s skewed federal structure is the 
removal of real constitutional responsibility 
from the state governors and local 
government chairmen and the transference 
of same to the federal government. 
Contradictorily, the governors and local 
government chairmen allocate and 
appropriate enormous resources as security 
vote under the guise of being the chief 
security officers of their respective domains, 
a situation that has the trappings of sleaze 
around it (Human Rights Watch 2007b).  
 
The security theorisation and preoccupation 
of the Nigerian state does not factor the 
human misery as a major constituent of the 
centrifugal pressures on national security. 
Human misery is seen as a manifestation of 
the consequential effects rather than a 
driving force of insecurity. This mindset 
could be responsible for the reactive rather 
than proactive orientation of the security 
strategies of the Nigerian state (Obi 1997). 
What this implies is that not only is there an 
absence of strategic security plan but also a 
lack of linkages between national security 
and provision of conditions for the material 
wellbeing of a significant percentage of the 
population. But the pursuit of security ought 
to start and end with the elimination of the 
factors that create, intensify and sustain 
human misery in the polity. As UNDP 
(1994:22) observes, “human security is not 
a concern with weapons-it is a concern with 
human life and dignity”. The dignity is 
conferred on the people by the 
responsiveness of the government to their 
social, economic, political and ethical needs.  
   
The Terrain of Amnesty in Nigeria 
Amnesty is a concept whose relevance is 
brought to the fore in conflict situations. It 
is associated with the preparedness of the 
state to suspend its powers to prosecute and 
punish individuals and groups who have 
contravened fundamental provisions of the 
laws. It involves the invocation of the 
powers of the state to cleanse from the 
official records of those under the purview 
of the amnesty arrangement, their 
culpability against it. Thus, amnesty does 
not operate in a vacuum but within the 
context of certain conditions. These 
conditions include: 
- It applies to rebellious acts against 
the state; 
- It is offered to a group or a class 
of criminals who may have 
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committed a crime against the 
state; 
- They need not be convicted by a 
court of law. It is enough that 
there is a constitutional basis upon 
which they can be ordinarily 
prosecuted; 
- It is extended by the state in order 
to restore tranquillity within its 
territory; 
- The felonies are expunged from 
the records of those concerned;  
- It is anchored on the fulfilment of 
certain conditions by the intended 
beneficiaries of the amnesty 
programme. It could be in form of 
signing pledges of good 
behaviour, community service and 
surrendering of firearms (Encarta 
2008; Akinwale 2010:204; 
Olatoke & Olokooba 2012:27). 
 
There is fundamental misconception among 
scholars and analysts about the meaning and 
purpose of amnesty. This misconception is a 
product of conceptual confusion arising 
from the extrapolation of the meaning of 
amnesty from pardon (Ukaogo 2010; 
Akinwale 2010:202; Olatoke & Olokooba 
2012:27). Sections 175 and 212 of the 
Nigerian Constitution, 1999, confer on the 
president and the governor of a state the 
power to exercise the prerogative of mercy 
after consultation with the Council of State 
or relevant advisory council respectively. 
 
Embedded in Section 175(1a) are the 
concepts of amnesty and pardon. The 
subsection provides that the president may 
“grant any person concerned with or 
convicted of any offence created by an Act 
of the National Assembly a pardon, either 
free or subject to lawful conditions”. An 
analysis of the provision brings to the fore 
its contemplation of the two concepts in one 
fell swoop. While the first part of that 
provision, that is, “any person concerned 
with” contemplates amnesty; the second 
part which refers to any person “convicted 
of any offence” falls under the purview of 
the concept of pardon. Thus, the distinction 
between the two concepts is that while 
pardon is given after a conviction and 
exempts the criminal from further 
punishment, amnesty is usually granted to 
persons who may have committed a crime 
but not convicted. 
 
Amnesty as a state strategy is deployed to 
contain centrifugal forces and maintain the 
corporate unity of the state in the face of 
seemingly intractable threats. The 
effectiveness of amnesty as a state strategy 
lies is given impetus by two factors: one, an 
unimpeachable demonstration of the 
superiority of the fire power of the state; and 
two, the willingness of the intended 
beneficiaries to discontinue the criminal 
activities for which amnesty is 
contemplated. The objective of amnesty is 
not to punish but to choose a path that will 
yield the best possible scenario for the 
triumph of peace. Thus, amnesty 
emphasizes the supremacy and expediency 
of a conducive atmosphere promotive of 
public welfare than prosecution (Olatoke & 
Olokooba 2012:26).  
 
In the course of Nigeria’s post-colonial 
experience, it has deployed the tool of 
amnesty on two occasions. The first was in 
connection with the Nigerian civil war. At 
the end of the war in 1970, the federal 
government declared the outcome of the war 
as “no victor, no vanquished”. This was a 
general amnesty that served the purpose of 
closing the unfortunate chapter which the 
war opened (Ukaogo 2010). The 
introduction of what came to be known as 
3Rs (reconciliation, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation) was a state policy designed to 
open a new chapter of reintegration of the 
secessionist Biafra into Nigeria. 
 
Although, the amnesty policy of 3Rs has 
been criticised as an empty rhetoric peddled 
to contain the security threat that open 
marginalisation of the Igbos would have 
spawned (Ukaogo 2010), it achieved the 
purpose of procuring a peaceful polity. The 
amnesty of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war 
appeared to be one-sided: rather than 
facilitate the integration of the Igbos, it 
fostered their alienation and relegation from 
the mainstream of Nigerian governance and 
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economic structures (Ojukwu 2002; Ukaogo 
2010). What the Nigerian state granted 
Chief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu 
under the presidency of Shehu Shagari was 
state pardon, an action that actually closed 
the chapter of the process that started in 
1970. 
 
The next instance of amnesty was on 25 
June 2009 when Nigeria’s former President, 
the late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua granted 
amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. For 
years, the Niger Delta was transformed into 
a cauldron of anti-state activities, which not 
only embarrassed the Nigerian state and 
undermined its economy but also spawned 
ripple effects in the international oil market. 
As the CBN (2009:130) corroborates, 
“declining production had characterized oil 
output over the previous five years due 
largely to militant activities and the 
attendant destruction of oil-production 
facilities”. The amnesty was the third in the 
line of strategies evolved by the Nigerian 
state to contain the destructive 
consequences of armed onslaught of the 
Niger Delta militants on the state. The two 
previous strategies were the 
bureaucratisation of the Niger Delta region 
through the creation of the Ministry of 
Niger Delta and the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC), under 
whose auspices the Niger Delta Master plan 
to anchor the sustained development of the 
region was evolved (Egwemi 2010:136). 
 
The Niger Delta amnesty programme 
represented a milestone in several respects. 
Firstly, it showed that a government was 
listening and willing to engage in peaceful 
resolution of the people’s grievances. 
Secondly, it marked a shift in the security 
and strategic orientation of the government: 
the government stood down its reliance on 
its seeming superior fire power to cow the 
people and embraced dialogue anchored on 
voluntary renunciation of violence by the 
militants. And lastly, the government was 
willing to make investments outside its 
traditional security window as it 
conceptualised the amnesty programme to 
have rehabilitation and reintegration 
components. Indeed, the Nigerian 
government projected then that the amnesty 
programme would cost the state some 
N10.14 billion (Nwozor 2010:29). 
 
Undoubtedly, the Niger Delta amnesty 
programme was a policy attempt to seek an 
alternative route to peace within the triad 
framework of anti-violence, pro-dialogue 
and welfarism (Nwozor 2010:33). But the 
pursuit of this peace was not without 
conditions. As Nwozor (2010:33-34) avers, 
“the president hinged the amnesty on 
several conditions: the willingness of the 
militants to give up all illegal arms in their 
possession, a complete renunciation of 
militancy in all its ramifications, and 
deposition to an undertaking to this effect”. 
The embracement of the programme by the 
militants enthroned peace in the region, 
which had multiplier effect on the Nigerian 
economy. As CBN (2009:130) 
acknowledges, “the federal Government’s 
amnesty programme brought relative peace 
to the Niger-Delta area in the second half of 
2009. Consequently, production level rose 
from 1.75mbd [million barrels per day] in 
January [2009] to 1.94mbd in September 
[2009] and closed at the end of the year at 
2.02mbd.”  
 
Boko Haram and the Spectre of Religious 
Anarchism  
The Boko Haram insurgency has been at the 
epicentre of Nigeria’s security crisis since it 
upped its terrorist activities in 2009. While 
both the origin and leadership composition 
of the Boko Haram sect are subject of 
speculation, their ideology and terrorist 
activities are not. Bagaji et al (2012:33) find 
semblance between Boko Haram and 
Maitatsine sects in terms of shared anarchic 
philosophy and objectives. The Boko Haram 
sect is professedly anti-west and considers 
terrorist strategy as a veritable jihadist tool 
to conquer the “infidels” (Onuoha 2012:2). 
Here, infidels are defined as those who are 
outside the template of orthodox Islam or 
those who condone or are sympathetic to 
western education and civilisation (Connell 
2012:90). Thus, the literal meaning of Boko 
Haram is “western education is sin”.  
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The arbitrary targets of Boko Haram’s 
sustained terrorist attacks appear to create 
analytical problems with regard to who it 
categorises as an infidel. There has not been 
any boundary in the targets of its attacks: it 
appears to attack everybody but with 
preponderance on Christian institutions. 
Essentially, the targets of the attacks 
masterminded by the Boko Haram have not 
followed any particular pattern to lead to a 
plausible conclusion about their driving 
motives and ultimate goals. The immediate 
deducible interpretation of their motives is 
that it intends to undermine the sovereignty 
of the Nigerian state through the creation of 
general insecurity by turning the country 
into a territory of anarchy. Their strategy 
could be likened to religious anarchism as it 
manifests the nature of, and also exemplifies 
the mainstream, terrorist tradition of the al-
Qaeda and Taliban-style organisational 
planning and armed resistance (Bagaji et al 
2012:33). 
  
The peculiarity and invincibility of the Boko 
Haram sect lie in its daredevil attacks, loose 
organisational structure, facelessness and 
surreptitious operational modalities.  The 
Boko Haram does not seem to harbour any 
genuine grievances against the Nigerian 
state either for its actions or inactions. The 
sect is driven by objectives, which are 
anchored on primitive utopianism. It is 
fixated with the irredentist quest to 
reconfigure and readapt the Nigerian state to 
an Islamic world created by them. As 
Onuoha (2012:2) puts it, 
Its ideological mission is quite 
clear, namely to overthrow the 
Nigerian state and impose strict 
Islamic Sharia law in the 
country. Members of the sect 
are motivated by the conviction 
that the Nigerian state is filled 
with social vices and corruption, 
thus ’the best thing for a devout 
Muslim to do was to “migrate” 
from the morally bankrupt 
society to a secluded place and 
establish an ideal Islamic 
society devoid of political 
corruption and moral 
deprivation’. 
  
The philosophy of religious bigotry which 
motorises the Boko Haram insurgency is 
undoubtedly at variance with the notion of 
peaceful coexistence, especially in a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious state like Nigeria. 
The Nigerian security cart has not tipped 
over the precipice because of the sense of 
restraint displayed by Christians in the face 
of consistent bombing of churches during 
worship. The Boko Haram has unleashed 
unprecedented mayhem on the Nigerian 
people, creating insecurity in its wake and 
calling to question the sovereignty of the 
Nigerian state. In 2012, it was estimated that 
the Boko Haram attacks were responsible 
for 750 deaths (The Nation 2012).  
 
Apart from the human casualties, the use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
targeted assassinations and suicide 
bombings have created pervading 
atmosphere of uncertainty, psychological 
trauma and general insecurity in Nigeria. 
According to Onuoha (2012:4), between 
July 2009 when the Boko Haram ostensibly 
declared war on the Nigerian state and 
January 2012, Boko Haram had carried out 
over 160 separate attacks which accounted 
for over 1000 deaths.  These attacks 
involved high-alert security targets like the 
Police Headquarters in Abuja, Police and 
Military Barracks, the United Nations 
Building in Abuja, and the Eagle Square 
situated at the centre of the seat of power in 
Abuja. 
 
One of the major attributes of Boko Haram, 
the one that has made its defeat problematic 
is its facelessness. There is no reliable 
intelligence to mount surveillance of its 
leadership or predict, with assurance, its 
next move to enable intelligence agencies to 
checkmate them. The call by certain 
analysts and statesmen for government to 
initiate negotiation with the group led 
Nigeria’s president, Goodluck Jonathan to 
challenge the sect’s leadership to identify 
themselves and state their demands as a 
basis for dialogue (BBC 2012b).  
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Added to this is the air of suspicion in the 
security agencies and the presidency about 
the existence of fifth columnists that are 
sympathetic to the Boko Haram. No less a 
personality than President Jonathan 
acknowledged this (BBC 2012a). The 
implication is mutual suspicion and 
structural difficulty in honestly dealing with 
the menace engendered by Boko Haram. 
The situation is made even more complex 
by lack of objective modalities to assess the 
level of loyalty of government officials and 
security operatives to the government or the 
level of their sympathy to the sect.  
 
Certain interpretations designate the Boko 
Haram violence as religious war which also 
has the potentiality of leading to ethnic 
cleansing. The linkage between religion and 
ethnicity in Nigerian polity is because of the 
domiciliation of the major religions 
(Christianity and Islam) along discernible 
geographical lines. The targeting of 
Christian worship centres by Boko Haram 
bombers led the president of Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN), Ayo 
Oritsejafor, to describe the attacks on 
Christians as a "systematic ethnic and 
religious cleansing" and threatened that “we 
have the legitimate right to defend 
ourselves. We're also saying today that we 
will do whatever it takes" (BBC 2012a). 
 
 
Rolling Back the Boko Haram Umbrage? 
State Security and the Politics of Amnesty 
In the face of the apparent failure of the 
various joint military task forces to bring the 
menace of Boko Haram under control, it 
was not surprising that the federal 
government decided to extend the olive 
branch to the sect as part of its non-military 
strategies to bring the human carnage and 
psychological trauma, which the sect has 
engendered, to an end. In June 2012, 
Jonathan sacked his Minister of Defence, 
Haliru Bello and National Security Adviser, 
Andrew Aziza as a demonstration of their 
ineffectiveness in tackling the country’s 
security crisis. In an interview, Jonathan 
was quoted to have said, “if you study the 
evolution of Boko Haram, they are changing 
their tactics every day, so you also have to 
change your staff and personnel to beat their 
styles.” (Vanguard 2012). 
Perhaps the success of amnesty in the Niger 
Delta must have underpinned the favourable 
disposition of the Nigerian government to 
extending same to the Boko Haram sect. 
The logic seems to be that since it worked 
for Niger Delta militants, it must also work 
for Boko Haram insurgents. The amnesty 
programme in the Niger Delta appeared to 
have worked like magic. With the 
announcement of the programme and 
positive response from the militants, there 
were perceptible results. Oil and gas 
production which had suffered acute 
reduction as a result of security threats in 
the region recovered dramatically, rising 
from 1.75mbd to 2.02mbd by the end of 
2009 (CBN 2009:130). 
 
The logic surrounding the replication of the 
Niger Delta amnesty “miracle” in the case 
of the Boko Haram is non sequitur. The 
conditions undergirding both scenarios are 
not the same to warrant the optimism that 
amnesty would become the magic wand to 
rein-in the Boko Haram menace. While the 
Niger Delta militants had grievances and 
demands, which were variously articulated, 
especially those encapsulated in the “Ogoni 
Bill of Rights” and “the Kaiama Declaration 
(Obi 1997; Sampson 2008; Omotola 2009), 
the Boko Haram does not have any 
document that consistently projects its 
demands. 
 
The Niger Delta agitation was a specific 
reaction to three scenarios: one, Nigeria’s 
skewed federal system which eroded their 
access to resources produced in their region; 
two, the impunity of the multinational oil 
companies (MNOCs) that destroyed their 
environment and rendered their lands 
infertile and incapable of sustaining 
livelihood dependent on them; and lastly, 
the strong-arm tactics of the Nigerian state 
that tended to intimidate them (Ofuebe & 
Anierobi 2006; Nwozor 2010). The Boko 
Haram insurgency, on the other hand, is 
anchored on the pursuit of an agenda of 
atavistic islamization of the Nigerian state 
(Onuoha 2012). 
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The leaders of the various Niger Delta 
militant groups were known to the 
intelligence agencies which facilitated 
discussions between them and government 
agents. In other words, at every point, the 
identity of the militants was neither in doubt 
nor a subject of conjecture. Since the death 
of Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram sect 
adopted diffuse leadership model which 
eliminated the identification of the sect with 
a single individual as its leader. The sect is 
believed to include various factions in 
addition to impostors and imitators. This 
poses a serious problem of legitimacy.  
 
The Niger Delta amnesty was facilitated by 
unfolding events at the national level. For 
the first time in democratic Nigeria, a Niger 
Deltan assumed the second highest position 
as the Vice President. This effectively 
shelved the allegation of marginalisation 
and paved the way for dialogue. This kind 
scenario is lacking in the case of the Boko 
Haram.  
Now, the question is: what has 
fundamentally changed to necessitate a 
volte-face by the government. Before now, 
the Government position has always been, 
and correctly too, that it could not dialogue 
with faceless individuals whose grievances 
were unknown (BBC 2012b). There are 
other questions whose answers are neither 
here nor there: is it more fruitful to placate 
“ghost terrorists” or to uncompromisingly 
and aggressively run them aground?  Does it 
advance the cause of peace if amnesty is 
granted to a group that believes in its 
invincibility and unready to recognise the 
undisputed sovereignty of the state? 
 
The granting of amnesty to any group must 
undergo “justice impact assessment” (JIC). 
JIC evaluates the general multiplier effects 
of the amnesty against people’s perception 
of justice, that is, how the exercise of the 
amnesty by the state will impact on their 
fundamental rights and expectations. It also 
involves the appraisal of the amnesty within 
the context of whether the interest of justice 
has been served.  
 
Certain pertinent issues whose 
unsatisfactory resolution could complicate 
rather than normalise the security situation 
must be properly addressed. Such issues as 
the level of injury suffered by the people, 
the percentage of atrocities that was 
deliberately targeted at civilian population; 
effect of the injury on life chances and 
livelihood of the people and the level of 
psychological trauma must be satisfactorily 
settled. For instance, it is estimated that 
between 3,000 and 4,000 people have 
brutally lost their lives in the various attacks 
orchestrated by the Boko Haram between 
2009 and 2012 ((Omo 2013; Guardian 
2013b), prompting Rupert Colville, 
spokesman for the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), to aver that some of the attacks 
carried out by Boko Haram could "amount 
to a crime against humanity."(UPI 2012). 
 
While amnesty is a political tool deployed 
to address issues which military actions may 
not resolve satisfactorily, it has elements of 
justice. The logic associated with the 
proposal to grant amnesty to the Boko 
Haram insurgents is patently deficient as it 
does not appear to address the issues of 
justice, morality and ethicalness contingent 
upon the extension of amnesty to the sect. 
The federal government set up a committee 
with its attention directed to working out 
modalities for amnesty without a 
corresponding committee to evaluate the 
effects of the Boko Haram violence on their 
victims (Channels Television 2013). 
 
Even though the Boko Haram claimed they 
have been waging war against the state 
(Onuoha 2012; Connell 2012:87), the 
abstract nature of the state which places it 
above the status of a victim, coupled with 
the targets of their attacks, renders its claim 
a falsity. There is neither connection 
between the state and several Christian 
churches that the Boko Haram sect has 
bombed nor is there any connection between 
the state and several private establishments 
that have suffered under the hands of Boko 
Haram bombings. Recently, the Boko 
Haram detonated IEDs in a luxury bus 
garage in Kano destroying over five buses 
and killing 60 persons (Punch 2013). Going 
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by empirical evidence, the state is the least 
affected of the various terrorist attacks of 
the sect. Indeed, the victims are the people 
who are caught in the crossfire of secularity 
and the deployment of terror to achieve the 
islamization of the country. (Bagaji et al 
2012:37). 
 
A fundamental question is whether the Boko 
Haram sect is qualified for amnesty. There 
are no objective criteria to anchor arguments 
on any side of the divide. Amnesty is at the 
discretion of the state and as has already 
been mentioned, it is a political tool that 
enables the government to save face, cut its 
losses and create a tabula rasa for the 
reengineering of its security system. But the 
powers of granting amnesty are not 
exercised in isolation but within the context 
of its overall costs to the state. The cost, 
here, does not just connote the financial 
burden on the state but includes the 
intangibles such as justice, psychological 
reassurance of the people and the general 
and specific repercussions of the amnesty 
both currently and in the future. The 
consequence of politicising amnesty lies in 
the devaluation and erosion of its relevance 
in the resolution of security problems 
outside the framework of legal and military 
actions. 
 
Conclusion 
The tool of amnesty is exercisable in 
conjunction with the intending beneficiaries. 
And its effectiveness lies when it is granted 
by one party and accepted by another. In the 
Nigerian context, the government seemed to 
have announced the amnesty programme 
without engaging in requisite consultations. 
This might have underlined the discordant 
tunes among officials in the presidency 
about the strategic merit of the amnesty 
programme as well as its outright 
denouncement by the Boko Haram sect, the 
supposed beneficiaries (Alli 2013; Guardian 
2013b).  
 
The denouncement of the proposed amnesty 
by the sect is demonstrative of 
unrepentance, a condition that does not 
conduce to amnesty. However, whether the 
Nigerian government goes ahead with the 
amnesty or decides to shelve it, any 
workable and sustainable amnesty 
programme must include the victims of the 
terrorist attacks of the book Haram sect; 
otherwise an omission will spawn the 
ground for the enthronement of anarchy that 
might create new centres of negative 
pressures and strains on the fabric of 
Nigeria’s national security. 
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